It is would be flawed and misleading to see the Turkish government’s recent decision to relocate the tomb of Süleyman Şah –the father of Osman I, the founder of the Ottoman Empire– as relating solely to the tomb’s location. The unrest in Iraq ignited by the US operations in 1991 and 2003 and the civil war that commenced in the spring of 2011 created a huge power vacuum, disrupting stability and public order in both countries. Deep religious, ethnic and sectarian fault lines were created. Iraq and Syria underwent a de facto disintegration. The resulting picture suggests that the ongoing fire cannot be extinguished in a short time.

The fire in our neighbors has, of course, effects on our country as well. Turkey’s conducting an operation, dubbed “Operation Şah Fırat,” to evacuate the Süleyman Şah tomb and the area of about 10 acres containing the tomb –which is recognized as Turkish property under international treaties– is one of these effects. Instead of deceiving ourselves with turgid rhetoric or high-sounding media reports or statements, we need to assess this retreat correctly and in all respects.

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) had besieged the tomb and the military outpost guarding it for eight months, hindering any replacement or reinforcement for the Turkish troops. The Turkish government decided to evacuate the site with the consideration that it might prove costly or problematic to Turkey to defend the site against any potential attack from the ISIL. In the final analysis, an area that belongs to Turkey under international treaties was abandoned. As we don’t have any document certifying that the new site of the tomb belongs to us under any international treaty, Turkey will inevitably face with serious challenges or objections in future.

The main argument of the ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AK Party) policy has been that Turkey is a “playmaker” in its region. This perspective has been repeatedly asserted in the context of various issues or problems. The recent developments, however, indicate that this assertion does not go with reality. When former Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan “scolded” the Israeli president in Davos and uttered remarks in the same vein later, this caught the fancy of Arab people, earning Erdoğan great sympathy. But Turkish officials were reluctant to see this popular sympathy was not shared by the rulers of those people and it even irked them. Real political factors were swept aside by those who were at the helm of Turkey’s foreign policy who were guided by romantic fantasies.

In cooperation with the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), we did our best to lend support the dissident groups of the Arab Spring so that they should overthrow their rulers. Yet, the MB didn’t have the capacity to drive the change neither in Egypt nor in Syria. Moreover, not only the United States and Israel, but also Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries strongly opposed to the idea of the MB’s coming to power.

In the end, Turkey was unable both to keep Mohamed Mursi of Egypt in power and to ensure the toppling of Bashar al-Assad of Syria. The large-scale support we lent to the Syrian opposition with our love for the MB proved futile. Thousands of people died and millions of people became refugees. The country went to rack and ruin. This was because the Nusayri Baath regime had been in power since 1965 and fully controlled the entire state apparatus, including the military, the police and the bureaucracy. Moreover, it could secure strong support from Russia and Iran. The ragbag of diverse militia forces which were at cross-purposes and failed to establish a central management and lacked military training and discipline could hardly overthrow Assad. We understood it, albeit late, but the damage is already done. Today, we face the threats from organizations like the ISIL threat and the Democratic Union Party (PYD), an offshoot of the terrorist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), in addition to a hostile Syrian government along our southern borders.  Surveys suggest that the rate of the ISIL’s supporters in Turkey is as high as 5 percent and the number of people who join the ranks of the organization from Turkey soars beyond estimates. On the other hand, the PYD has aroused great sympathy in the US and the West for its struggle against the ISIL. The PKK has now a de facto state in Rojava or Western Kurdistan in northern Syria, and rules it with the Kurdish Communities Union (KCK) regime. The outcome of the foreign policy that advertised Turkey as a “playmaker” in the region has left Turkey with multifarious external and internal threats. To get out of this conundrum, we must abandon our fancies and get back to reality, and come up with a realistic policy that takes our power, capacity and resources into consideration.

* The council president of the Ankara Chamber of Commerce (ATO) and a former president of Turkish Hearths (Türk Ocakları)